Nominal versus Real Convergence with Respect to EMU Accession - EMU Entry Scenarios for the New Member States by Gunther Schnabl & Paul De Grauwe
  1
 
Nominal versus Real Convergence with Respect to EMU Accession 




Paul De Grauwe 
Katholieke Universteit Leuven, Center for Economic Studies 
Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium 
Tel: +32 16 326794 –  Fax. +32 16 326796 
E-mail: paul.degrauwe@econ.kuleuven.ac.be 
 
Gunther Schnabl  
Tübingen University, Department of Economics and Business Administration 
Nauklerstrasse 47, 72074 Tübingen, Germany 






This paper explores the conflict of real and monetary convergence during the EMU run-up of the 
Central and Eastern European new EU member states. Based on a Balassa-Samuelson model of 
productivity driven inflation, it finds a high probability of higher inflation in the new member 
states. It compares the policy options which might make the compliance possible, i.e., fiscal tighten-
ing and nominal appreciation within the ERM2 band. Nominal appreciation within ERM2 seems 
the better option to achieve the compliance with the Maastricht criteria as no discretionary govern-
ment intervention is necessary and losses in terms of real growth are less. Having once opted for 
nominal appreciation within ERM2 by fixing the ERM2 entry rate as the ERM2 central rate (Irish 
model), a high degree of flexibility is provided in coping with erratic short-term capital inflows. 
Setting the ERM2 entry rate above the ERM2 central rate (Greek model) implies a clear exchange 
rate path within ERM2 and thereby less exchange rate volatility. Despite the merits of nominal ap-
preciation, countries committed to hard euro pegs or with high budget deficits might choose fiscal 
contraction as a solution, which will require a high degree of fiscal flexibility and thereby decisive 
structural reforms. 
 
Keywords:  EMU, ERM2, Balassa-Samuelson effect, real appreciation, monetary union, Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
JEL:  E52, F31  2
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction..................................................................................................................................3 
2.  The Balassa-Samuelson Effect with Respect to EMU Accession ...............................................4 
2.1.  The Basic Model..................................................................................................................4 
2.2.  Critique and Empirical Evidence.........................................................................................6 
2.3.  Fiscal Contraction versus Nominal Appreciation..............................................................10 
3.  Case Studies of EMU Entry.......................................................................................................11 
3.1.  The “Flexible” Irish Model................................................................................................11 
3.2.  The “Rigid” Greek Model..................................................................................................12 
4.  Entry Scenarios based on Nominal Appreciation......................................................................13 
4.1.  Exchange Rate Flexibility within the Whole Band............................................................13 
4.2.  Exchange Rate Flexibility within the upper 15% band......................................................14 
4.3.  Heterogeneous EMU Entry Strategies and the Maastricht Criteria...................................15 
References..........................................................................................................................................18 
   3
1. Introduction 
 
The enlargement of the European Union (EU) heralds the enlargement of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU). With their EU accession all new member states have become members of the 
EMU—although with a derogation. While the obligatory EMU membership can be postponed by 
not meeting the Maastricht criteria (as presently Sweden does), most new member states want to 
join as soon as possible. They expect welfare gains in terms of enhanced macroeconomic stability, 
more trade, and lower interest rates (De Grauwe and Schnabl 2004).  
Given the considerably lower stage of economic development, the compliance with the 
Maastricht criteria will be more difficult than for the present EMU members. Assuming that the 
ongoing real economic catch-up process of the new member states is likely to lead to higher infla-
tion than in the euro area the incompatibility of the Maastricht inflation and exchange rate criteria 
has been stressed (Halpern and Wyplosz 2001, Buiter and Grafe 2002, De Broeck and Sløk 2002). 
Several studies have explored solutions to the Maastricht “dilemma”. Following McKinnon 
(1984) Buiter and Grafe (2002: 41-42) propose to apply the Maastricht inflation criterion to traded 
goods only to exclude the productivity driven CPI inflation from the convergence process. Szapáry 
(2002) suggests “a waiver” or “derogation” to the inflation criterion for countries with a strong 
Balassa-Samuelson effect. But both the renegotiation and the complete derogation of (one of) the 
nominal Maastricht criteria would violate the “prerequisite of equal treatment” (European Central 
Bank 2004: 7-8).  
As the Maastricht criteria are likely to be applied in a strict manner (ECB 2004: 8), the 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2003) suggests a “careful timing” of EMU accession. If the new member 
states join the EMU after having accomplished their economic catch-up process, productivity driven 
inflation differentials will be negligible. The downside of this approach would be an (in the new 
member states) undesired long waiting period. 
If they want to achieve a fast EMU membership, restrictive macroeconomic policies in the 
EMU run-up may be necessary. Begg et. al (2001: 40-41)—who scrutinize the impact of interna-
tional capital inflows to the present southern EMU member states during their EMU accession pe-
riod—argue that tighter fiscal policies were helpful in controlling inflation and overheating. Buiter 
and Grafe (2002: 41) suggest that the candidate countries need a transitional recession to depress 
inflation. Gros et al. (2002) argue that a restrictive macroeconomic policy would dampen the price 
gap between traded and non-traded goods and thereby the upward-drift of consumer price inflation. 
Fiscal contraction to curb inflation may be supported by a “non-inflationary wage policy” as sug-
gested by the National Bank of Slovakia (2003).   4
While fiscal contraction may be an adequate tool to comply with the nominal (and simultane-
ously the fiscal) Maastricht criteria, it will require a high degree of fiscal flexibility and cause sig-
nificant losses in terms of real growth. We therefore explore nominal appreciation within the ±15% 
ERM2 band as an alternative adjustment mechanism to productivity driven inflation to ensure com-
pliance with the Maastricht criteria in the EMU run-up. 
2.  The Balassa-Samuelson Effect with Respect to EMU Accession 
 
In the 1960s, Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) observed that developing countries experienced 
higher productivity gains in the tradable sector than industrial countries. At the same time higher 
consumer price inflation contributed to a secular “catch-up” of prices.  
2.1. The Basic Model 
 
Our basic version of the Balassa-Samuelson model is a two-country model with a tradable goods 
(industry) and a non-tradable goods (services) sector as described by De Grauwe and Skudelny 
(2002). We assume perfect competition in the tradable goods markets and perfect mobility in the 
national labour markets—but no labour mobility between the two countries. There is no direct com-
petition between the non-traded sectors of the two countries and no competition between the traded 
and non-traded goods sector within each country.  
The production of traded and non-traded goods in each country is based on two Cobb-
Douglas production functions for the traded goods sector T and the non-traded goods sector NT:  
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In equation (1) Y
i is the (real) output, A
i is technology, K
i is (fixed) capital, and L
i is the employed 
labour force in sector i.
1 In both sectors output is generated by combining technology, capital and 
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1   The overall labor force of the economy L is assumed constant: 
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Nominal wages in the traded and non-traded sectors are assumed to be equal as perfect labour mo-
bility between the traded and non-traded sector is assumed ( W W W
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  If productivity in the non-traded goods sector is assumed constant, according to equation (4), 
an increase in traded goods productivity increases the relative price of non-traded goods. As the 
overall consumer price level is a composite of traded and non-traded goods, the general price level 
will rise.  
 
Pegging the Exchange Rate 
 
The increase of non-traded goods prices relative to traded goods prices can be achieved in two ways 
relying on the monetary framework. In the new member states we currently observe a broad variety 
of exchange rate arrangements ranging from hard pegs to the euro in Estonia and Lithuania to 
(more) flexible exchange rates in the Czech Republic and Poland.  
First we study the impact of fixed exchange rates on the adjustment mechanism that applies 
for the group with tightly fixed exchange rate arrangements. We assume that Euro Area (E) tradable 
prices (
T
E P ) are exogenous for the accession country (A) and for simplicity constant (
T
E P ). Further, 
we assume that purchasing power parity holds for the traded goods sector. Traded goods prices in 
the accession country (
T
A P ) are determined based the exchange rate against the euro ( / AE E ) and on 
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Now, if the exchange rate of the accession country currency is assumed constant against the 
euro ( E A E / ), traded goods prices in the accession country are constant (
T
A P ) as well. As shown in 
equation (4), given fixed nominal exchange rates, productivity gains higher in the traded goods sec-
tor will lead to higher inflation in the non-traded goods sector. As the consumer price index is a 
                                                 
2   As γ
T and γ
NT are larger than 0 and smaller than unity.   6
composite of traded and non-traded goods, consumer price inflation will be higher than in the euro 






























An alternative adjustment mechanism is provided when a country chooses to “peg” inflation, i.e., to 
adjust consumer price inflation (close to) the EMU level while allowing the exchange rate to float 
(more) freely. While all Central and Eastern European countries had adopted macroeconomic 
frameworks based on exchange rate stabilization throughout most of the 1990s, recently some coun-
tries—Poland, the Czech Republic and implicitly the Slovak Republic—have moved recently to-
wards inflation targets leaving the exchange rate (more or less) free to float (Schnabl 2004).  
  If inflation is brought (close) to the Euro Area level—as required by the Maastricht inflation cri-
terion—relative productivity will adjust via the nominal exchange rate. With prices of foreign 
traded goods assumed exogenous and constant (
T
E P ) and (non-traded goods) inflation fixed to the 
EMU level (
NT
E P ), the nominal exchange rate will appreciate. Because inflation is equal to the Euro 
Area level, the nominal appreciation against the euro is equal to the real appreciation, which is 





















2.2. Critique and Empirical Evidence 
 
There are short-comings to the Balassa-Samuelson model as presented in section 2.1. The assump-
tions such as perfect competition in international goods markets, perfect labour mobility between 
sectors, and absent competition in services may be too restrictive. Furthermore, the real appreciation 
                                                 
3   Real appreciation will also induce an adjustment of the current account to net capital inflows. As additional net 
capital inflows will be spent on both traded and non-traded goods, the current account deficit would be ceteris pari-
bus smaller than net capital inflows. The higher relative prices on non-traded goods will shift the demand to traded 
goods to ensure that the current account is matched by the capital account. 
   7
pressure which originates in supply side productivity gains may be weakened or enhanced by other 
factors outside the Balassa-Samuelson framework. 
Productivity gains are not restricted to the industrial sector. Besides the catch-up in the in-
dustry, the Central and Eastern European countries are undergoing significant structural changes in 
the service sector such as banking, insurance, transport and retailing (Mihaljek and Klau 2003). 
This may be even more the case, because an increasing number of services are becoming tradable 
thereby accelerating efforts to restructure. If productivity growth would be the same in the industrial 
and service sector, based on equation 3 relative prices between the traded and non-traded goods 
sectors would remain constant and the Balassa-Samuelson effect would be absent.  
To shed light on this issue Table 1 shows productivity changes in the large new member 
states where data on value added (volumes) in both the industrial and the service sector are avail-
able.
4 We observe that productivity changes are more volatile in the industry than in the service 
sector. Industrial productivity growth is high during periods of economic expansion and falls rap-
idly in times of recession. For instance, during the 1998/99 Czech economic crisis or during the 
2001/2002 economic downturn in Poland and Hungary industrial productivity growth was slowing 
sharply or even became negative. Productivity changes in the service sector are less volatile.  
Yet in average, for all four countries industrial productivity has been growing significantly 
faster than in the service sector. For the period from 1994 up to 2002 the yearly averages for all 
countries are 6.97% for the industrial sector in comparison to 3.52% for the service sector. The up-
shot is that productivity growth in the service sector may soften, but would not invalidate the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Furthermore, non-traded goods inflation is not solely driven by the supply side as suggested by the 
Balassa-Samuelson model. Also the demand side matters (Bergstrand 1991). As wages, income, 
wealth and consumption increase in both the industrial and service sector, the relative price of non-
traded and traded goods is affected depending on the private consumption pattern: (1) If the demand
 
for both traded and non-traded goods grows at the same rate, the demand effect is neutral and the 
relative price between non-trade and trade goods is solely driven by supply side effects. (2) If the 
growth of private aggregate demand is biased towards the traded goods sector the supply side effect 
is (partly) offset by the income effects. (3) If consumer demand is biased towards non-traded goods 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect is enforced. 
                                                 
4   Productivity measures as sectoral output per employee lead by and large to the same results, but the sample would 
be more fragmented due missing data.    8
Option (3) is the most likely outcome. If incomes rises due to increased productivity, the 
demand for services is likely to increase relative to traded goods because “nontraded services are 
luxuries in consumption while traded commodities are necessities” (Bergstrand 1991: 325): Coun-
tries with rising (real per capita) income will exhibit higher demand for non-traded services relative 
to traded (industrial) goods. The relative price of non-traded to traded goods is likely to rise thereby 
enhancing the supply-side driven appreciation pressure. 
Given that the Central and Eastern European economies are very open, in specific for trade 
with the EU15, the (cyclical) demand side effects on prices may even originate abroad, independent 
from domestic productivity gains. For instance, as experienced in 2003 sluggish demand (and low 
inflation) in EU center countries contributed to lower inflation in the new member states. When the 
economies in the western part of the European Union started to recover in 2004, inflation in the new 
member states resumed quickly (Table 2). 
To this end, even if both supply and demand side effects are taken into account, inflation in 
the EMU accession candidate countries is difficult to predict and the single determinants are diffi-
cult to disentangle. Nevertheless inflation is likely to be higher than in the Euro Area. Empirical 
estimations suggest the Balassa-Samuelson effect (and other reinforcing effects) to be in the range 
of 1.0% to 3.0% per annum (Mihaljek and Klau (2003: 4) give an overview).  
Empirical evidence on the likelihood of higher inflation in the new member states is shown 
in Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5. Table 3 lists whole economy productivity gains for the new mem-
ber states in comparison to Germany. Productivity in new Central and Eastern European member 
states has been and is expected to grow considerably faster. Based on the information given in 
Table 1, a considerable part of this productivity growth can be assumed to originate in the industrial 
sector. 
The changes of consumer prices relative to wholesale prices can be used as an indicator for 
(expected) productivity driven inflation as shown in equation 3. In Table 4 positive values indicate 
higher CPI inflation (as a proxy for non-traded goods prices) in comparison to wholesale price in-
flation (as a proxy for traded goods prices). In most years for most countries consumer prices grew 
faster than wholesale prices as indicated by the large number of positive entries. In average for all 
Central and Eastern European countries consumer prices have increased considerably faster than in 
Germany. This trend is weaker for countries such as the Czech Republic and Poland which have 
(temporarily) allowed for considerable nominal appreciations of their currencies.  
 
[Table 3 and Table 4 about here] 
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As shown in equation 5, real appreciation against the euro captures both higher inflation than in the 
Euro Area and nominal appreciation of the domestic currency against the euro. In Table 5 we use 
Germany as the reference country to compute real appreciation against the euro and the German 
mark back to 1994. Negative values indicate real appreciation against the German mark (represent-
ing the euro starting in 1999).  
It is evident from Table 5 that in most years for most countries the currencies of the new 
member states were under real appreciation pressure, which is in line with the relative productivity 
gains vis-à-vis the Euro Area. Real appreciation is in average least for Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia 
which have reached the highest stage of economic development in terms of GDP per capita. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
A lower degree of real appreciation and even real depreciation in some countries in 2002 to 2004 
could be seen as an indication of a gradually fading real appreciation pressure as the new member 
states approach the productivity level of the EU15. Yet the catch-up process of the new member 
states and therefore the rise of price levels can be expected to continue for a considerable period of 
time. As shown in Figure 1 differences in terms of both GDP per capita and price level are still sig-
nificant. In many countries both indicators are still less than half of the EU15. Given a robust rela-
tionship between the real GDP per capita and the price level which is suggested by the Balassa-
Samuelson effect and empirically shown by Kravis and Lipsey (1988) we would expect that both 
the economic catch-up process and the increases in price levels will continue for a considerable 
period of time. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
To provide evidence on the time dimension of the economic catch-up process Figure 2 shows the 
gap between Japanese and US CPI inflation and (real) appreciation of the Japanese yen against the 
US dollar.  Japan’s economic catch-up, which was driven by high industrial productivity gains com-
pared to the US, lasted from about 1960 up to the late 1980s—roughly 30 years. During the fixed 
rate period Japan moved from the fixed (Bretton Woods) exchange rate regime to flexible rates in 
the early 1970s.  
Figure 2 shows how Japan’s relative productivity gains were adjusted under fixed exchange 
rates by higher inflation (than the US) and later on by nominal appreciation. The left panel of Figure 
2 plots inflation in comparison to the United States. During this period inflation remained consis-  10
tently higher than in the US. After Japan had moved to flexible rates in the early 1970s, relative 
productivity gains were reflected in nominal appreciation of the Japanese yen against the dollar 
(right panel of Figure 2) and inflation was lower than in the US. Under both exchange rate regimes 
Japanese productivity gains led to the real appreciation of the Japanese yen against the dollar as 
shown in the right panel of Figure 2. 
Given Japan’s experience, we would expect that the real appreciation pressure on the Cen-
tral and Eastern European currencies would persist—at least for one or two decades. The inflation-
ary pressure may even increase in the wake of EMU accession as observed for some of present 
EMU members such as Ireland due to accelerated capital inflows. Depending on the exchange rate 
regime these capital inflows will enhance nominal appreciation in the case of more flexible rates. If 
exchange rates are fixed, additional inflation will emerge via official foreign currency purchases 
which result in an increasing money supply.  
All in all, as shown in Table 2, higher inflation will remain a considerable concern in the 
EMU accession candidate countries. In the past, most of them—with the exception of Lithuania—
would not have fulfilled the Maastricht inflation criterion (Table 2). In Poland and the Czech Re-
public, where the Maastricht criterion was fulfilled in 2002 and 2003, the previous nominal appre-
ciations of their currencies are likely to have contributed to lower inflation.  
 
2.3. Fiscal Contraction versus Nominal Appreciation 
 
Given that under higher productivity growth fixed exchange rates and convergence of inflation are 
difficult to achieve simultaneously as required by the Maastricht criteria, the EMU accession candi-
dates have to consider macroeconomic measures to cope with the dilemma of real versus nominal 
convergence dilemma as shown in section 2. 
Two solutions are possible. First, some countries will pursue tight exchange rate pegs to the 
euro. After having entered the ERM2 in July 2004, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia have remained 
committed to a narrow ERM2 bandwidth close to ±0% although the official ERM2 bandwidth has 
been set to ±15%. The hard peg to the euro is likely to lead to higher inflation than in the euro area. 
Fiscal contraction to meet the Maastricht inflation criterion will be necessary. Sufficient fiscal flexi-
bility requires structural reforms, which may be implemented easier in smaller than in larger coun-
tries.  
While fiscal consolidation will support the efforts to meet the fiscal Maastricht criteria for 
these countries, whose deficits are above the 3% limits, there will be considerable costs in terms of 
an economic downturn in the advent of EMU accession. Macroeconomic volatility will increase, as   11
the fiscal tightening will be relaxed after the EMU entry. Furthermore, there remains uncertainty 
about the adequate degree and timing of fiscal measures which may destabilize expectations on the 
EMU entry process. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
 
3.  Case Studies of EMU Entry 
 
Nominal appreciation within the ERM2 band may be a viable alternative for restrictive fiscal poli-
cies for two reasons: First, adjustment to higher inflation by nominal appreciation is “automatic”. It 
does require any discretionary government action. Second, as adjustment is achieved by relative 
price changes between traded and non-traded goods and therefore through expenditure switching, 
losses in terms of real growth will be less.  
The prerequisite of equal treatment would imply that the new member states will be able to 
pursue similar accession strategies as the present members. This applies for both the ERM2 band 
width, which was ±15% for the present members, as well as for the accession strategies, which were 
“more flexible” in the cases of Ireland and Greece. Therefore pre-EMU entry Ireland and pre-EMU 
entry Greece provide the possible blueprints for an EMU entry based on more exchange rate flexi-
bility within ERM2. 
3.1. The “Flexible” Irish Model 
 
As shown in Figure 4, before its EMU entry the Irish pound experienced wide fluctuations around 
the central rate but within the ERM1 ±15% limits. In December 1997—one year before the planned 
EMU entry—the Irish currency was quoted at around 8% below the bilateral DM central rate, which 
was in line with the significant productivity growth relative to the EU core countries and inflation 
converging towards the EMU Maastricht benchmark. Because the central rate could be expected to 
correspond to the final conversion rate (fixed rate rule), this implied—given no further policy 
measures—an 8% depreciation of the Irish pound over the next twelve months (Figure 4).  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Given the prior appreciation of the pound, the Irish government had two options of setting 
the final entry rate. Leaving the bilateral central rates unchanged would have meant that the preva-  12
lent bilateral central rates would have corresponded to the final bilateral EMU entry rates. As ex-
change rates were likely to be more responsive to changes in market expectations than short-term 
interest rates, without revaluation of the central rate the final announcement of the conversion rate 
could be expected to trigger a move of the exchange rate towards the conversion rate.
5 Such sharp 
depreciation would have stimulated growth, but would also have caused additional inflationary 
pressure to the (post-)EMU entry Irish economy—possibly putting the Maastricht inflation criterion 
at risk and contributing to overheating.  
  The alternative was to revalue the bilateral central rates to avoid such sharp depreciations. If, 
for instance, the bilateral central rate had been revalued by 8% no upward pressure on prices and 
wages would have emerged, but at the cost of less growth. The Irish government opted for a 3% 
revaluation of the bilateral central rates in March 1998 which corresponded to a compromise be-
tween depreciation and “complete” revaluation (Honohan 1997). 
  
3.2. The “Rigid” Greek Model 
 
While the Irish model has the merit of flexibility, it suffers from sharp exchange rate movements 
prior to the final fixing of the entry rate. In specific, sharp exchange rate fluctuations of large coun-
tries such as Poland may disturb the macroeconomic stability in smaller neighboring EMU aspirant 
countries. Although the exchange rate of the Greek drachma did not appreciate in the wake of the 
EMU entry,
6 the Greek model might provide useful insights for the new member states, because it 
ruled out sharp exchange rate fluctuations by setting the ERM2 entry rate different from the ERM2 
central rate. 
The Greek EMU entry process is shown in Figure 5. On March 16 1998 the Greek drachma 
entered the ERM1 with a significant depreciation at a central rate equivalent to 353.109 drachmas 
per euro. In September 1998, the Greek government announced to participate in ERM2 with a 
bandwidth of ±15%. In January 1999 Greece entered ERM2 with a central rate of 353.109 drach-
mas per euro—about 7.5% above the then market rate of around 329 drachmas per euro on Decem-
ber 31 1998 (Garganas 2003).  
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
                                                 
5   Depreciation was also suggested by interest rate differentials. Despite the appreciation of the Irish pound Irish short-
term and long-term interest rates had remained higher than in Germany.  
6   Due to a small industrial and a large service sector (tourism) no Balassa-Samuelson effect could be observed in 
Greece.   13
Because the ERM2 central rate against the euro was expected to correspond to the final con-
version rate (fixed rate rule), this implied a nominal depreciation of the drachma within the ERM2 
band. The central rate provided the upper limit for the depreciation because any rise beyond the 
central rate would have caused doubts about Greece’s ability to enter EMU. In effect the ERM2 
bandwidth was reduced to 15% with the exchange rate moving upward (depreciation) within a 7% 
to 8% corridor towards the central rate.  
When the depreciation proceeded slowly during the first year of ERM2 membership, the re-
valuation of the central rate to 340.75 drachma per euro in January 2000 helped in reaching the final 
conversion target more smoothly. Finally, on June 19 2000 the ECOFIN Council announced the 
Greek EMU membership starting from January 2001 together with the final conversion rate which 
corresponded to the prevailing ERM2 central rate of 340.75 drachmas per euro.  
 
4.  Entry Scenarios based on Nominal Appreciation 
 
Applying the Irish model to the EMU entry of the new member states would provide flexibility to 
exchange rate movements prior to the final fixing. The (reversed) Greek model could reduce ex-
change rate volatility while allowing for adjustment to productivity driven real appreciation pres-
sure. 
  
4.1. Exchange Rate Flexibility within the 30% Band 
 
As shown in section 2, given large differentials in productivity growth in the new member states, a 
nominal appreciation below the central rate is more probable when inflation rates converge towards 
the EMU level. Speculative capital inflows which anticipate EMU membership may enforce the real 
appreciation pressure. Once the conversion rate is announced, exchange rates will depreciate to-
wards the central rate as shown by De Grauwe, Dewachter and Veestraeten (1999). The resulting 
inflationary pressure can be cushioned by a revaluation of the central rate.  
The Irish entry scenario is simulated in Figure 6 under the restrictive assumption that ex-
change rates adjust gradually to the Balassa-Samuelson effect via nominal appreciation taking into 
account that inflation is (close to or) equal to the EMU level.
7 We simulate yearly nominal (and 
real) appreciations of 1% up to 5%.  
 
                                                 
7   In practice the nominal exchange rates can be assumed to be more volatile, in particular as capital controls are re-
moved.    14
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
As shown in Figure 6, in most cases, nominal appreciation would be sufficient to accommodate the 
equilibrium appreciation pressure. (Intra-marginal) central bank intervention would remain neces-
sary to control for sharp short-term exchange rate fluctuations which might surpass the ±15 limits.  
  Further, we assume that the assessment of compliance with the Maastricht criteria takes 
place after 24 months ERM2 membership (waiting room approach) and that at the same time the 
final EMU conversion rate
8 after—say—six months after assessment is announced. At this time the 
currencies of the new member states have probably appreciated considerably as shown in Figure 6. 
If the prevalent central rate would be announced to be the conversion rate, the respective currencies 
would gradually depreciate towards the conversion rate starting—or even prior—from the day of 
the announcement.  
  To dampen the resulting inflationary pressure the revaluation of the central rate has to be 
considered. Six months prior to EMU entry, the final conversion rate is easier to determine than at 
ERM2 entry. The degree of revaluation will be subject to negotiations between the EMU and the 
accession country. In Figure 6 we assume that a further appreciation is projected and relative pro-
ductivity gains are fully incorporated in the determination of the final conversion rate. Nevertheless, 
a mixed strategy as pursued in Ireland which allows for some depreciation prior to the EMU entry is 
possible. 
 
4.2. Exchange Rate Flexibility within the upper ±15% band 
 
In contrast to the Irish model the Greek model suggests to set the ERM2 entry rate different from 
the ERM2 central rate to reduce exchange rate volatility. In Greece exchange rate volatility during 
ERM2 membership was much smaller than in Ireland because the entry rate and the central rate 
projected a clear exchange rate path towards EMU membership. The danger of sharp reversals of 
international capital flows will be less, as long as the entry strategy (including the fiscal criteria) 
remains credible. 
  In contrast to Greece, which allowed for a gradual depreciation within ERM2, the entry rate 
of the new member states would be above the central rate because a nominal appreciation is ex-
pected. Figure 7 simulates the EMU entry based on the Greek model (in reverse). Like in the Irish 
model we assume a probationary period of 24 months in ERM2 (waiting room approach) and an 
additional six month membership after successful compliance. We assume that different countries 
                                                 
8   This corresponds to the central rate due to the fixed rate rule.   15
have different degrees of real appreciation. With inflation rates assumed to be (close or) equal to the 
EMU we simulate nominal appreciation.  
  In order to project the adequate ERM2 entry rate exact information is needed concerning the 
degree of expected appreciation and the duration of ERM2 membership. Here we assume apprecia-
tions from 1% up to 5% and a stay in ERM2 of 30 months—two years probationary period before 
assessment and six months preparation for EMU accession (waiting room approach). Based on 
these assumptions the ERM2 entry rates can be calculated recursively. As shown in Figure 7 a high 
expected nominal appreciation will project a higher ERM2 entry, while a low expected real appre-
ciation will lead to an ERM2 entry closely above the central rate. As for Greece the de facto band-
width will be considerably smaller than 30% (maximum < 15%) depending on the ERM2 entry rate. 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
  Setting the ERM2 central rate above the entry rate is based on the idea that the currencies 
will appreciate toward the projected EMU entry rate. This scenario implies a clear commitment in 
favour of the pre-announced EMU entry rate. If this commitment is credible, exchange rate volatil-
ity will be low to provide a safe EMU entry. Faster appreciation pressure than projected can be ad-
justed by a revaluation of the central rate. In contrast, less appreciation than expected will lead to 
additional appreciation pressure thereby putting an additional restrictive effect on the EMU acces-
sion candidate. 
 
4.3. Heterogeneous EMU Entry Strategies and the Maastricht Criteria 
 
As both hard pegs to the euro and gradual appreciation within ERM2 constitute possible EMU entry 
strategies the new member states are likely to choose different entry options. This may—given that 
the Maastricht criteria for EMU entry remain unchanged—make the EMU entry for the group of 
countries with hard pegs even more difficult. 
  According to the Maastricht Treaty and the respective protocols inflation should “not exceed 
by more than one percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in 
terms of price stability.” As the best performing members in terms of inflation will be chosen 
among all EU25 member states, these new member states which allow for gradual appreciation of 
their currencies are more likely to be the best performing members in terms of inflation.  
  For instance in 2003, Poland (0.7) and the Czech Republic (-0.1) which had previously al-
lowed considerable appreciations of their currencies were among the three best performing mem-  16
bers. Together with Lithuania (-1.1) the average inflation was -0.16 which is significantly below the 
2.1 HICP inflation of the Euro Area as a whole—and also significantly below the 1.2 average of the 
three best performing EMU members Germany (1.0), Austria (1.3), and Finland (1.3).  
  This implies that heterogeneous entry strategies might constitute an additional entry barrier 
for countries pursuing hard pegs in contrast to countries which allow for nominal appreciation. In 
fact the countries which opt for nominal appreciation will elevate the hurdle for countries with fixed 
exchange rate strategies. This may suggest a coordination of entry strategies.  
 
5. Outlook   
 
 
Eight Central and Eastern European economies have joined the European Union. As the new mem-
ber states have explicitly indicated their strong intention to join the EMU as soon as possible they 
face the Maastricht dilemma of real versus nominal convergence. There is no indication that the 
nominal criteria will be redesigned for the new member states.  
  This paper focused on nominal appreciation as the main option to achieve a smooth EMU 
membership. We have shown in section 2 that there exists a substantial systemic upward pressure 
on inflation that may put their EMU membership at risk. A number of countries will need to follow 
a policy of fiscal consolidation. In other countries, restrictive budgetary policies are not necessary. 
Whatever the budgetary policies these countries follow, it appears that the best they can do to take 
care of real appreciation pressure consists in allowing for a gradual nominal appreciation of their 
currencies.  
   Having once opted for gradual appreciation the Irish or the reversed Greek models could be 
the blueprint for ERM2 membership. Defining the ERM2 entry rate as the ERM2 central rate pro-
vides a high degree of flexibility during the probationary period, but it allows for sharp exchange 
rate fluctuations and opens the door to strategic behaviour with respect to the EMU entry rate. 
Choosing the ERM2 entry rate above the ERM2 central rate helps to reduce exchange rate volatility 
and thereby to achieve a safe EMU entry. It necessitates clear information about expected apprecia-
tion and the duration of ERM2 membership. 
Although nominal appreciation within the ERM2 corridor seems the better choice to recon-
cile nominal and real convergence, there are countries that have decided to adopt hard pegs to the 
euro (Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia and potentially Latvia). Given the considerable investment these 
countries have made in the credibility of these arrangements, it does not seem desirable to change 
these arrangements.    17
There are countries which will have to go through a process of fiscal consolidation prior to 
their entry into the euro zone. Our main conclusion also holds for these countries. A gradual appre-
ciation of the currencies of these countries is desirable. In the absence of such appreciation, these 
countries will have to follow policies of fiscal restriction that are tighter than is necessary to satisfy 
the Maastricht fiscal criteria.  
Finally, given irrevocably fixed exchange rates, higher inflation is a very likely outcome at 
the new Eastern periphery of the enlarged EMU. Once a new member state has achieved EMU en-
try, higher inflation is in line with the Maastricht Treaty. As we regard this higher inflation as the 
outcome of the catch of productivity, real GDP per capita and price levels, i.e., an equilibrium phe-
nomenon, is it not problematic from this perspective. But the challenge of a one size fits all mone-
tary policy, i.e., the dangers of highly heterogeneous real interest rates within the Euro Area will 
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Table 1: Productivity Changes in the Industrial and Service Sectors (Percent) 
  Czech Republic  Hungary  Poland  Slovak Republic 
  industry services industry services industry services industry services 
1994  11.90 3.33  6.74  3.94 11.27 4.44 10.91 0.44 
1995  11.93 2.61  8.52 -0.93 13.64 4.34 35.65 5.23 
1996  13.75  0.44 3.98 2.08 8.81 4.16 2.23 2.00 
1997  6.22  0.83 13.40 1.92 14.39 3.27 -2.49 13.14 
1998  -8.49 5.24  10.30  3.50 7.48 4.01 5.24 4.59 
1999  -2.07 1.51 8.33 2.70 4.01 4.34 2.94 1.24 
2000  8.02 0.83 6.93 4.48 7.27 3.31 -1.96 7.64 
2001  2.59 6.43 2.51 4.10 -0.79 2.36  10.23  4.60 
2002        2.83  4.02  1.52  2.90       
Average  5.48 2.65 7.06 2.87 7.51 3.68 7.84 4.86 
Source: OECD. Productivity calculated on the basis of value added (volumes).   21
Table 2: HICP Inflation in the New Member States (Percent) 
  CZ CY EE HU LV LT MT PL SK SI MIB 
1999  1.8  1.1  3.1 10.0 2.1  0.7  2.3 7.2  10.5  6.1 2.1 
2000  3.9 4.9 3.9  10.0  2.6 0.9  3.0 11.0 8.2 8.2  2.5 
2001  4.5  2.0  5.6 9.1 2.5  1.3  2.5  5.3 7.2 8.6 2.9 
2002  1.4  2.8 3.6 5.2 2.0  0.4  2.6  1.9  3.5 7.5 2.5 
2003  -0.1  4.0 1.4 4.7 2.9 -1.1  1.9  0.7  8.5 5.7 1.3 
2004*  2.8  1.8  3.8 6.7 7.7 3.0  3.2  4.7 7.0 3.4 3.7 
Mean  2.5  3.1 3.7 7.1 3.5 0.9  2.6  4.7 6.9 6.7 2.6 
Source: ECB. CZ = Czech Republic; CY = Cyprus, EE = Estonia, HU = Hungary, MT = Malta, 
LV = Latvia, LT = Lithuania, PL = Poland, SK = Slovak Republic, SI = Slovenia, MIB = Maas-
tricht inflation benchmark. HICP = Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices. * Values up to Oc-
tober 2004. The Maastricht inflation benchmark (MIB) is calculated for every year as an aver-
age of the three best performing EU25 members in terms of price stability. Shaded areas indi-
cate that the hypothetic Maastricht inflation criterion has been met.   22
 
 
Table 3: Productivity Changes in the Whole Economy (Percent) 
  CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL  SI  SK DE 
1994  n.a. n.a. 1.79 n.a. 4.89  13.70 -4.21 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1995  n.a. 5.15  11.43  n.a. 3.01  10.62 5.26 n.a. n.a. 5.65 1.52 
1996  22.47  4.12 7.01 1.83 2.44 5.79 3.70 3.99 5.24 3.74 1.06 
1997  2.58 -0.03  10.51  4.41 4.86 3.75 6.35 3.90 5.49 5.94 1.57 
1998  3.75 0.36 7.23 3.02 3.42 5.04 8.13 2.40 3.48 4.66 0.88 
1999  3.37 2.62 4.55 0.95 3.29 5.17 -1.18 6.99 4.46 4.26 0.79 
2000  2.13 3.99 9.42 4.17 -1.60  10.12 7.94 6.42 0.67 3.95 1.08 
2001  2.06 3.16 5.51 2.80 -4.12 5.70  10.86 1.65 2.21 3.17 0.39 
2002  0.62 0.94 5.87 3.43 2.48 4.77  15.15 3.69 3.75 5.52 0.66 
2003  1.50 3.75 3.63 1.70 1.66 5.63 6.53 4.92 2.82 1.87 0.87 
2004  2.69 n.a. 4.73 2.60 1.67 5.70 5.49 4.16 3.10 3.39 1.32 
2005  3.18 n.a. 5.48 2.75 0.83 5.63 5.32 3.61 3.13 3.51 n.a. 
Mean  4.43 2.67 6.43 2.77 1.90 6.80 5.78 4.17 3.44 4.15 1.01 
Source: ECB. CY = Cyprus, CZ = Czech Republic, EE = Estonia, HU = Hungary, MT = Malta, 
LV = Latvia, LT = Lithuania, PL = Poland, SI = Slovenia, SK = Slovak Republic.  
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Table 4: Changes of Consumer Prices Relative to Wholesale Prices (Percent) 
 CY  CZ  EE  HU  LV  LT  MT  PL  SI  SK  DE 
1994  1.33 4.41 n.a. 5.89  16.33 18.94 n.a. 2.44 2.81 3.12 2.13 
1995  -0.97 1.53 2.54 -0.17  11.69 8.84 n.a. 2.01 0.59 0.80 -0.01 
1996  0.82 3.82 7.19 1.47 3.46 6.27 n.a. 5.85 2.86 1.62 2.70 
1997  0.79 3.51 2.03 -1.71 4.14 7.43 n.a. 2.58 2.15 1.55 0.70 
1998  1.71 5.45 3.81 2.61 2.73 10.40 n.a. 4.18 1.89 3.34 1.34 
1999  0.42 1.09 4.58 4.68 6.64 -0.73 n.a. 1.68 3.91 6.51 1.60 
2000  -2.85  -0.94  -0.80  -1.72 2.02  -14.06 n.a. 2.25 1.10 2.04 -1.76 
2001  0.38 1.84 1.29 4.22 0.76 5.16 n.a. 3.78 -0.48 0.68 -1.02 
2002  1.43 2.34 3.14 6.75 1.01 4.10 n.a. 0.71 2.24 1.22 1.77 
2003  1.20 0.39 1.13 2.16 -0.26 -0.78 n.a. -1.90 2.96 0.23 -0.65 
2004*  0.37 -1.62 0.26 4.03 -1.14 -4.64 n.a. -2.77 -0.45 4.16 0.35 
Mean  0.42 1.98 2.52 2.56 4.31 3.72 n.a. 1.89 1.78 2.30 0.65 
Source: IMF: IFS. CY = Cyprus, CZ = Czech Republic, EE = Estonia, HU = Hungary, MT = 
Malta, LV = Latvia, LT = Lithuania, PL = Poland, SI = Slovenia, SK = Slovak Republic. * 
January – October. 
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Table 5: CPI Based Real Appreciation against the Euro (German Mark) (Percent) 
  CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL  SI  SK 
1994  -1.07  -6.01 -30.35 0.73 -36.17  -44.32 -0.62  -1.46  -1.59  -3.87 
1995  3.18  -2.72 -21.06 7.30 -13.13  -17.06 3.05  -4.02 -6.59 -2.80 
1996  -3.30  -9.18 -17.56 -5.06 -14.24  -22.47 -3.34 -10.35 0.51  -5.80 
1997  -5.96 -4.89 -7.81 -8.54  -14.00  -18.80  -8.19 -6.56 -3.77 -8.63 
1998  -1.96 -8.43 -6.80 -0.05 -3.50 -5.34 -2.22 -5.65 -4.17 -2.29 
1999  -0.54 1.07 -2.68 -3.07 -6.57 -4.32 -3.08 2.55 -0.60 2.35 
2000  -3.41 -5.70 -2.48 -4.90  -11.40  -13.08  -5.83  -12.71  -1.27  -12.83 
2001  0.35 -6.79 -3.52 -7.93 0.05 -2.25 -1.18  -11.57  -0.40 -3.07 
2002  -1.52 -9.84 -2.16 -8.83 2.96 -2.28 0.52 4.29 -1.83 -3.27 
2003  -1.35 4.36 -0.20 0.70 8.90 2.14 4.91  14.68  -1.06  -9.44 
2004*  4.69 0.12 -1.20 -4.27 -0.86 0.52 -0.58 3.95 0.17 -7.62 
Mean  -0.99  -4.36 -8.71 -3.08 -8.00 -11.57  -1.51 -2.44  -1.87 -5.21 
Source: IMF: IFS. CY = Cyprus, CZ = Czech Republic, EE = Estonia, HU = Hungary, MT = 
Malta, LV = Latvia, LT = Lithuania, PL = Poland, SI = Slovenia, SK = Slovak Republic. * Janu-
ary – October.   25
 































Source: Eurostat. Relative price level indices.    26















































real and nominal yen/dollar exchange rate 
Source: IMF: IFS. Real exchange rate calculated based on consumer prices. 
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ERM1 bilateral central rate
lower limit
 
Source: IMF: IFS.   29


























ERM1 DM central rate
(converted into euro)
 
Source: IMF: IFS. Before January 1999 the DM represents the euro.   30
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